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Abstract: 
 The main objectives of this study are to measure the voluntary 
disclosure level in the annual reports of Jordanian companies listed on 
Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) and to examine the relationship 
between a number of corporate governance mosaic and the level of 
voluntary disclosure. Unweighted disclosure index consisting of 54 
voluntary items was developed to assess the level of voluntary 
disclosure in the annual reports of 111 listed companies on ASE for the 
year 2012. Univariate and Multivariate analysis were applied to 
explore the relationship between each explanatory variables and the 
level of voluntary disclosure and a number of sensitivity tests were 
taken to further analysis. The findings of the study reveal that the level 
of voluntary disclosure in Jordanian corporate annual reports is low 
(its average is 32.4% for the year 2012). Univariate and multivariate 
analysis reveals that board size and audit committee size have a 
significant positive relationship with the level of voluntary disclosure 
while independent directors and ownership structure have a 
significant negative relationship with the level of voluntary disclosure. 
The findings of this study have important implications for authority 
regulators, policy makers, shareholders and other users of reports who 
have an interest in best practices of corporate governance. 
 
Key words: Voluntary Disclosure; Corporate Governance; Firm 
Characteristics; Amman Stock Exchange. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Information should be prepared, audited, and disclosed in 
accordance with high quality accounting standards. 
Stakeholders and potential investors require access to regular, 
reliable and comparable information in details for them to 
assess the stewardship of management, and make informed 
decisions. A strong disclosure regime enhances transparency, 
and it is a powerful tool for influencing the behavior of 
stakeholders. It results in the attraction of more capital, 
sustains investors’ confidence in the capital market, and 
possibly prevents fraud. Inadequate information may increase 
the cost of capital and result in a poor allocation of resources. 
Moreover, the business environment has witnessed changes 
over the years, mainly been influenced by globalization and 
technological innovation. Companies worldwide are now vying 
to penetrate international capital markets. Therefore, the 
disclosure of adequate and reliable information is necessary. 
In recent years Amman Stock Exchange has experienced 
remarkable increases in trading volumes, market capitalization 
and the number of corporations listed on the market; for 
instance, market financial capitalization has almost tripled 
over the last five years. In addition, the market is expected to 
gain from the recent political development in the region, the 
importance of disclosure in a market economy cannot be 
overemphasized if scarce resources are to be distributed to their 
most productive uses. Further, it is widely acknowledged that 
the quality of investment decisions depends, to a large extent, 
on the quality and quantity of information available to 
investors. The general purpose of this study therefore is to 
extend our knowledge about the disclosure practices, mainly, 
voluntary disclosure, in corporate annual reports of Jordanian 
companies listed on the ASE. 
Various studies have tackled the association between 
corporate governance attributes, firm characteristics and 
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voluntary disclosure. Many researchers have used similar 
research approaches in different circumstances (Rouf, 2012). 
Nevertheless, findings of empirical studies observably differ 
from one country to another. This is expectedly due to the 
distinctive business environment attributable to each study.  
This study attempts to answer the question of how to explain 
the voluntary disclosure of companies listed on an emerging 
capital market. It aimed at examining the level of voluntary 
disclosure particularly that of Jordanian listed companies, and 
the effect of firm characteristic, and corporate governance 
attributes on the level of voluntary disclosure. 
The objective of this study is to investigate the factors 
that affect companies to disclose voluntary information in their 
annual reports of Jordan. The specific objectives of the proposed 
study are: 
1. To measure the level of voluntary disclosure of 
information made by the listed companies in Jordan.  
2. To examine the relationship between a number of 
corporate governance mosaic and corporate voluntary 
disclosure level of Jordanian listed companies. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
 
2.1. Independent Directors 
One of the variables increasingly used in recent disclosure 
studies is the ratio of independent directors on the board. 
Inclusion of outside directors on the board might enhance the 
viability of the board as an internal control, prevent 
expropriation of security holder wealth (Fama, 1980), attenuate 
agency costs and create pressure for better disclosure (Forker, 
1992). If independent directors on the board actually conduct 
their controlling and monitoring role, good corporate 
governance is strengthened (Chau and Gray, 2010), boards 
effectiveness is enhanced (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002), disclosure 
quality is improved and more information disclosure is 
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expected. As Healy and Palepu (2001) explain, the board of 
directors and information disclosure can be considered 
complementary mechanisms to reduce the problems of the 
agency relationship.  The results of previous studies are not 
consistent in relation to the association between proportion of 
independent directors on the board and the level of voluntary 
disclosure. Some studies found positive significant association 
between the two variables (Chau and Gray, 2010;  Rouf, 2012), 
some studies found negative association (Gul and Leung, 2004) 
and some others found no significant association (Ho and Wong, 
2001; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Alves et al., 2012). Thus, the 
following is hypothesized:  
H1: There is a significant positive relationship between the 
proportion of independent directors on the board and the level 
of voluntary disclosure found in annual reports. 
 
2.2. Audit committee size 
limited research has been undertaken to investigate the 
relationship between voluntary disclosure and the features of 
audit committee. Forker (1992) was the first paper to propose 
this relationship. The author suggests that the audit committee 
is as an effective monitoring mechanism to enhance the quality 
of corporate disclosure and reduce agency costs. Furthermore, 
Ho and Wong (2001) argue that the existence of an audit 
committee significantly influences the amount of corporate 
disclosure. In their empirical studies (Barako et al., 2006; Ho 
and Wong, 2001; Haniffa, 2008) conclude the predictable 
positive connection between audit committee size and level of 
voluntary disclosure. We further predict a similar association 
above, positive association between audit committee size and 
the level of voluntary disclosure. thus, develop our hypothesis 
as follows: 
H2: There is a positive relationship between audit committee 
size and the level of voluntary disclosure found in annual 
reports. 
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2.3. Board size 
Board size is a significant corporate governance characteristic. 
Board size has a positive effect on the level of corporate 
voluntary disclosure (Samaha et al., 2012; Nadndi and Ghosh, 
2012 ; Hassan, 2013). Larger boards are more efficient for 
corporate performance since they have a wide range of 
collective experience and expertise that may assist in making 
better decisions. A large number of directors on the board can 
lower the likelihood of information asymmetry. The former 
research reveals that a large board may cause the company 
monitoring activities to become less efficient. Conversely, other 
studies suggest that the board’s monitoring abilities augment 
with the increase in the number of members on the board. 
(Cheng and Courtenay, 2006) state that there is no theory to 
suggest an association between board size and voluntary 
disclosure level, they tested their hypothesis and found no 
significant association, and thus, this relationship stays an 
empirical matter. Considering this controversy, this paper does 
not detail direction to the connection between board size and 
voluntary disclosure but it hypothesizes that: 
H3: There is positive relationship between board size and the 
level of voluntary disclosure found in annual reports. 
 
2.4. Ownership structure 
Ownership structure is one of the mechanisms that associate 
the interest of shareholders and mangers. unlike the UK and 
the US which have dispersed ownership, ownership in 
Jordanian public listed companies are much more concentrated 
or owned by the insider (Al-Fayoumi et al., 2010), so that’s why 
this study uses managerial ownership as proxy to measure 
ownership structure.  
Managerial ownership means a large proportion of 
shares are owned by the management of a company. The 
expectations of this study, with regards of managerial 
ownership, are related to the agency theory. To align the 
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interests between the owners and agents (managers), a possible 
solution is to provide the managers, with partial ownership 
(shares). Managers, who are the shareholders of the entities, 
are motivated to increase the entities values, as well as to 
increase shareholders wealth, as it will also increase their own 
wealth. Accordingly, information disclosure will increase, 
because managers with greater shareholdings can derive 
greater share-market benefits from better disclosure. Therefore, 
it is expected that as managers have the same interests as the 
owners, they will disclose more information. Previous studies 
found a positive relationship between managerial ownership 
and disclosure in the US (Nagar et al., 2003) in Malaysia 
(Mohd-Nasir and Fayoumi, 2006). Therefore, in this research, it 
is hypothesized that:   
H4: There is a significant a positive a relationship between 
managerial ownership and the level of voluntary disclosure 
found in annual reports. 
 
2.5. Control variables 
To test the main hypotheses, this thesis includes a number of 
control variables (Firm size, Leverage, Profitability, Liquidity, 
Industry type, Auditing firm and Audit quality). These control 
variables are included, as they are reported in the literature to 
be associated with voluntary disclosure. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
3.1. Sample and Data Collection 
To be included in the sample, listed firms must satisfy the 
following selection criteria in order to test the hypotheses 
developed: Firms must be listed on ASE in (2012) and the 
annual reports are available for examination; Financial firms 
are excluded from the sample, as they are subject to a different 
accounting system and disclosure requirements in Jordan. 
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3.2. Measurement of the level of voluntary disclosure 
Previous studies have mostly utilized disclosure checklists to 
collect voluntary disclosure data. Hossain and Hammami (2009) 
state that selection of voluntary disclosure items is a subjective 
judgment depending on the nature and context of the industry 
and country context. 
To determine the disclosure level of voluntary items, 
earlier studies have utilized two approaches: weighted (Ho and 
Wong, 2001) or unweighted index (Alsaeed, 2006; Hossain and 
Hammami, 2009; Chau and Gray, 2010). The utilization of a 
weighted disclosure index has been criticized since it may 
introduce a bias towards a particular user orientation (Barako 
et al., 2006), and is based on a subjective importance rating 
ranked by the researchers (Alsaeed, 2006). Therefore, we 
adopted unweighted index in this research; this approach is 
most appropriate when no importance is given to any specific 
user groups (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Hossain, and Hammami, 
2009). The items of information are numerically scored on a 
dichotomous basis. According to the unweighted disclosure 
approach, a firm is scored “1” for an item disclosed in the 
annual report and “0” if it is not disclosed. The total voluntary 
disclosure index  is then computed for each sample firm as a 
ratio of the total disclosure score to the maximum possible 
disclosure by the firm. 
 
3.3. Model Specification 
A secondary method for data collection has been used in this 
study. The data set for variables is collected from financial 
information available on the websites of companies. The 
dependent variable used in the model is the level of voluntary 
disclosure of the firm. The information for this is collected from 
the annual reports of the companies, for the year 2012.  
The information on independent as well as control 
variables is also collected from annual reports of the companies. 
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Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression is employed to 
examine the relationship between variables. 
 
Voluntary Disclosure Index= β0 + β1 PIND + β2 ACS + β3 
BSZE + β4 SOE + β5 lnASST +β6 LEV + β7 ROA+β8 INDU + β9 
BIG4 + β10 AF + e 
 
Table 1 Independent and Control variables Identification 
 
Hypothesis Variables Label Measurement Exp. 
sign  
H1 Independent 
directors 
PIND Number of independent directors/Total 
number of directors on the board of 
directors 
+ 
H2 Audit 
committee 
size 
ACS The total number of member on the 
audit committee 
+ 
H3 Board size BSZE The total number of member on the 
Board size 
+ 
H4 Ownership 
structure 
SOE Percentage of equity owned by the 
insiders (directors, managers) to all 
equity of the firm. 
+ 
Firm size  lnASST log of total assets  
Leverage  LEV Total liabilities/ Total assets  
Profitability  ROA Return/Total assets (ROA)  
Industry type  INDU Dummy variable: 1= manufacturing 
firm and 0= Service Firm. 
 
Auditor type  BIG4 Dummy variable: 1= if a firm’s auditor 
is an international audit firm ( big 4) 
0= if a firm’s auditor is other 
 
Audit quality  AF The total amount of Audit fees (The 
current study will use the amount of 
external audit fees as a proxy of audit 
quality) (Paul et. al, 2014) 
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4. Empirical Results 
 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 shows that the level of average voluntary disclosure in 
the sample companies is 32.4% the highest score achieved by a 
firm is 76.1% and the lowest score is 16.7% with a standard 
deviation of 0.148%. So the firms are widely distributed with 
regard to voluntary disclosure. 
 
Table 2 The descriptive statistics for dependent and Independent 
variables 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Dep. Variable     
VD 0.324 0.148 0.167 0.761 
Indep. variable     
PIND 0.745 0.364 0.000 0.865 
ACS 3.641 0.122 3.000 6.000 
BSZE 8.435 2.674 5.000 14.000 
SOE 0. 314 0.345 0.074 0.923 
 
4.2. Univariate Analysis 
Table 3 presents the correlation matrix of the variables, it 
shows a number of strong correlations between some 
explanatory variables. This implies the possibility of 
Multicollinearity problems. The largest reported correlation 
value among the variables as shown in Table 3 (0.347) was 
between board size and board independence variable. However, 
this value is still lower than the critical value of 0.80 according 
to (Cooper and Schindler 2008). Hence, Multicollinearity 
between the independent variables is not considered a serious 
problem. 
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Table 3 Pearson Correlation Analysis Results 
Variables VD PIND ACS BSZE SOE LnASST LEV ROA INDU BIG4 AF 
VD 1.000           
PIND 0.225** 1.000          
ACS 0.118* 0.031 1.000         
BSZE 0.304** 0.347** 0.056 1.000        
SOE 0.254** 0.142* 0.024 0.004 1.000       
LnASST 0.416** -0.181* 0.149* 0.112* 0.196** 1.000      
LEV -0.143* 0.065 0.066 0.034 -0.069 0.171* 1.000     
ROA 0.119* 0.188** 0.081 0.271** -0.085 0.182* 0.032 1.000    
INDU 0.216** 0.158* 0.093 0.065 0.046 0.113* 0.313** -
0.041 
1.000   
BIG 4 -
0.169** 
-0.131* -0.051 -
0.342** 
-0.053 -0.151* -0.167* 0.059 -
0.217** 
1.000  
AF 0.101* 0.121* 0.148* 0.234** -0.036 0.118* 0.139* 0.036 0.037 0.037 1.000 
 
4.3. Multiple Regression analysis 
This study estimates the regression equation (1) and (2) using 
restricted to clearly illustrate the effects of each control 
variables group on the level of voluntary disclosure. And 
estimate the regression equation (3) to clearly illustrate the 
effects of control variables on the level of voluntary disclosure 
in presence of other voluntary disclosure determinants as 
controls. 
 
Restricted Model 1 
 
Voluntary Disclosure Index= β0 + β1 PIND + β2 ACS + β3 BSZE 
+ β4 SOE + β5 lnASST +β6 LEV + β7 ROA+β8 INDU + e 
The second version of the model incorporates 
independent variables and control variables which associated to 
firm characteristics. Restricted model 2 regresses the level of 
voluntary disclosure on the independent variables and control 
variables which associated to the firm characteristics, as shown 
from Table 4, R2 = 0.488 which means that the model, which 
includes eight variables, explains 48.8% of the variance in the 
level of voluntary disclosure .In addition, the overall model is 
significant, since F=30.154 and the significance value is less 
than 1% (0.000). 
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Restricted Model 2 
 
Voluntary Disclosure Index= β0 + β1 PIND + β2 ACS + β3 BSZE 
+ β4 SOE + β5 BIG4 + β6 AF + e 
The second version of the model incorporates independent 
variables and control variables which associated to the 
Auditing. This model intends to measure the impact of 
variables which are independent directors, audit committee 
size, board size and ownership structure incorporates Auditing 
related control variables on the level of voluntary disclosure. 
Restricted model 2, as shown from Table 4 , R2 = 0.478, which 
means that the model, explains 47.8% of the variance in the 
level of voluntary disclosure .In addition, the overall model is 
significant, since F=36.130 and the significance value is less 
than 1% (0.000).  
 
Restricted Model 3  
Voluntary Disclosure Index= β0 + β1 INDU + β2 BIGFOUR + β3 
LS+ e 
Restricted model 3 regresses the level of voluntary 
disclosure on specific control variables without independent 
variables to know how control variables are significant in 
expected directions consistent with previous research. The 
adjusted R2 increases from 48.8%, 47.7%  for the Restricted 
model 1 and Restricted model 2 to 49.6% for the full model , The 
result, therefore, suggests that the firm characteristics and 
governance variables considered in this study are all significant 
determinants of voluntary disclosure in the predicted 
directions. 
The result suggests that firms have a higher 
independent directors on the board is negative associated with 
voluntary disclosure and It is statistically significant at the (p-
value= 0.026**) so H1 is not supported.  This result is similar to 
that of (Barako, et al., 2006; Ho and Wong, 2001; Gul and 
Leung, 2004). 
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The board audit committee is positively associated with 
company’s voluntary disclosure practices. With the significant 
at the (p-value= 0.059*), Thus, H2 is supported. This indicates 
that the higher audit committee members may have positive 
impact on the level of voluntary disclosure .This result is 
similar to (Barako et al., 2006; Haniffa, 2008).  
Board size is statistically significant at the (p-
value=0.034**) which suggests that a larger board is positively 
related to the level of voluntary disclosure so H3 is supported. 
It can explains by larger boards are more efficient for corporate 
performance since they have a wide range of collective 
experience and expertise that may assist in making better 
decisions. This result is similar to (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; 
Allegrini and Greco 2011; Akhtartuddin et al., 2009; Nadndi 
and Ghosh, 2012). 
The regression coefficient for the ownership structure is 
(-0.053) which is negative and statistically significant at the (p-
value = 0.061*) level so H4 is not supported. This means that 
within Jordanian listed firms, the higher proportion of equity 
owned by the insiders (directors, managers) on all equity of the 
firm, the less likely a firm will be to engage in a higher level of 
voluntary disclosure in their annual reports. When managerial 
ownership is highly concentrated, the managers gain more 
control of the firm’s operating, reporting and disclosure 
decisions, they become more entrenched and they have the 
ability to expropriate minority shareholders’ wealth. 
(Akhtaruddin and Haron 2010; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006) 
also find that information disclosure is likely to be less when 
there are higher levels of managerial ownership. 
 
4.4. Sensitivity analysis  
A number of sensitivity tests are undertaken to further 
analysis, different proxies are used for the key variables to 
ensure that different methods of measuring the constructs do 
not completely drive the overall results and conclusions. 
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Using the institutional ownership as an alternative measure of 
ownership structure. The main regression results of this study 
report a significant and negative association between the 
ownership structure as proxy by proportion of managerial 
ownership and the level of voluntary disclosure. In this section, 
extra sensitivity analyses are carried out to further the 
understanding of the potential impact of Jordanian ownership 
structure on its voluntary disclosure practices. Where it’s 
measured by institutional ownership, Institutions are 
considered one of the types of block holder ownership. The 
findings reflect the same results, as they reflect a negative and 
significant association between ownership structure 
(institutional ownership) and dependent variables (Coeff.= -
0.062 and p-value = 0.095*).  
 
5. Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
The answer for research question 1: The evidence which 
reported shows that in aggregate, the general level of voluntary 
disclosure by Jordanian listed firms is arguably low (with the 
mean of 32.4%).  
The results support the expectation that the level of 
voluntary disclosure in Jordan as an emerging capital market 
with secretive culture is low, however. It is also found that 
companies manage their voluntary disclosure policy which is 
not a random practice but subject to certain influences. Maybe 
one of the reasons for this low level of voluntary disclosure is 
the lack of effective regulation and law enforcement by the 
stock exchange regulatory bodies may contribute to the low 
level of information transparency, particularly voluntary 
disclosure. In general, we can indicate that there is room to 
improve the transparency of the Jordanian capital market. The 
study highlights the possibility of cooperation between the 
capital market authority and all interested parties to enhance 
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transparency by providing pattern of voluntary disclosure and 
corporate governance practice. 
The answer for research question 2: The evidence which 
reported shows that in aggregate, the statistical results 
indicate that corporate governance attributes do affect the level 
of voluntary disclosure in firm annual reports. Four variables 
were found to be associated with the level of total voluntary 
disclosure in firm annual reports; two positively and two 
negatively. board size and audit committee size, were found to 
have positive significant association with the level of total 
voluntary disclosure. However, the percentage of independent 
directors and ownership structure were found to be negatively 
associated with total voluntary disclosure. 
Furthermore, the study has some implications for firms, 
auditors, investors, and regulators. All these parties play an 
important role in improving the transparency and disclosure 
practices of corporations. firms may increase voluntary 
information disclosure by being aware of advantages of 
information disclosure. Investors may demand higher 
disclosure from management. Regulatory bodies, such as the 
Capital Markets Board, may guide firms by issuing guidelines 
for proper voluntary disclosure practices in annual reports. 
Finally, auditing firms may also make contributions in 
improving firms’ corporate education about disclosure practices. 
The study has got some implications for emerging markets such 
as Jordan particularly. These markets have high growth rate 
and are expected to sustain their growth in the coming years. 
To grow their financial capital, they need external capital. In 
this respect, attracting international capital flow to these 
markets is very important. On the other hand emerging 
markets have some deficiencies such as concentrated 
ownership, high information asymmetry, greater agency costs 
which hinder free flow of capital. Consequently, voluntary 
disclosure contributes to alleviate these problems, makes the 
firms more transparent and accountable, and open the way for 
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capital flow. Therefore, the subject is quite important for 
emerging markets. However, it should be kept in mind that 
firms cannot carry out this transformation without support of 
regulatory bodies. 
The focus of this study was limited to one source of 
information, the annual report. Although annual reports are 
considered to be the most important source of information, 
there are other sources of information in Jordan that could be 
useful for decision making, such as interim reports, ASE 
publications, prospectuses, internet sources and financial press 
releases. These sources of information sources were not 
included in this study and might form important data sources 
for future research disclosure studies. Moreover, the recent 
developments in technology and communications suggest a 
need to pay more attention to internet sources of information. 
This study focused upon one country, mainly Jordan. An 
extension of the study could be to compare disclosure between 
Jordan and other developing countries in the Middle East. 
Collecting data for more companies in different countries, 
especially those with different disclosure regulations would 
enhance the validation of the results in this study and would 
determine the differences and similarities in policy makers' 
decisions across the region. Such studies would be useful to the 
literature on comparative international accounting. 
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Note:  (***) indicates significance at 1% level; (**) indicates significance at 
5% level and (*) indicates significance at 10% level. The reported p-values are 
all two-tailed except intercept. All variables are defined in previous sections. 
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